On the military strategies in Ukraine

A closer look, and current breakthroughs

As an archaeologist and historian, battlefield exploration and the history of war has always been a main area of interest for me. The current war in Ukraine is no exception. Already, I pour over the aerial images of the front lines, with their vast trench systems, and I am comparing them with the World War I trench systems.

On another note, the Russians don’t call it a war: it is a ‘special military operation’. Is that in line with the American ‘police actions’ and such? Or is there something to it?

Let’s start with a view by ‘Marinus’, in the August 2022 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette (Vol. 106 No. 8), titled ‘The Russian Invasion of Ukraine’. (I will summarize and use verbiage from the article, but will not indicate quotes unless using larger parts of sentences or whole sentences, for ease of reading.) The author notes that the invasion from the beginning seemed different leading to a very confusing overall picture (not helped by propaganda claims that put objectives in the mind of the Russians, which were failed to be won, and as such became ‘proof’ of inept leadership, failure, weakness, etc. on part of the Russian army), and tried to shed light on what actually happened by treating each of the main fronts as a distinct campaign, and coupling each campaign to a very long history of Russian operational warfare.

First, the north, in the region around Kiev:
Noting the concept of the ‘raid’ (a word that the Russians borrowed in the late 19th century in their military vocabulary as ‘reyd’ after noting “the similarities between the independent cavalry operations of the American Civil War and the already well-established Russian practice of sending mobile columns, often composed of Cossacks, on extended excursions through enemy territory”. In 2022, in similar style, the Russian army groups that entered deeply into the area around and north of Kiev, simply rushed forward, bypassing every one of the larger population centers.

The effect this had, was to draw substantial elements of the Ukrainian army away from their concentration near the Donbass region, and move them towards Kiev as reinforcement.

In support of what ‘Marinus’ wrote, it is important to also note the use of paratroopers to capture the airport of Gostomel, in those early days. As BigSerge wrote in his brilliant article on the Russo-Ukrainian War, the “Red Army operational doctrine classically called for targeted paratrooper assaults to be conducted at operational depths, for the purpose of paralyzing defenses and tying up their reserves.” This seems to make the most sense: paratroopers attack Gostomel, they get relieved within a single day by a rushing column of regular infantry and armored units that bypass every larger population center, and arrive in Gostomel, Bucha and Irpin as their southernmost advance. Those three towns are directly contiguous, spanning no more than 7 miles from one through the other. But they also lay immediately north of a very important traffic axle, the E40. For almost a whole month, these Russian units drew important reinforcements towards Kiev, away from elsewhere in the Donbass, and prevented a quick and seamless transport of troops, materiel, and supplies from the Western part of the country by blocking the E40, disrupting the Ukrainian supply chain.

Next, Marinus wrote, was the Southern region. This region saw a rapid occupation that wasn’t all to different from the raids used in the North, except that in the South the Russian troops didn’t bypass larger population centers, but actively conquered and occupied them, with a clear goal towards permanent possession (namely by bringing in administrative and other civil authorities to take over the local Ukrainian government and leadership, replacing not just the flags, but also banks, cell phone companies etc. with Russian ones, introducing the Ruble as money system, rebuilding housing units at a later day, calling for referenda about their political allegiance, and so on).

At the same time, raids towards Mykolaiv towards the West (the last main city before reaching Odessa), tied up more troops to defend this Western area, away from the Donbass region. In general, this rapid expansion provided a solid land corridor that connected Crimea back to Russia, and allowed restoring water supply back to this peninsula (the blocking of which is an actual war crime: this was done years before by Ukrainian forces, after the Russians had captured Crimea in 2014. This had no military value, but disproportionately affected the civilian population and agriculture in that area.)

The article pointed out that this tactic was very similar to what the Russians did when conquering the Baltic states in 1940, the suppression of reformers in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the early Cold War, and Afghanistan in 1979.

In the East, Marinus wrote that this portion of the front resembled Stalingrad. Adding good insight, he explains that in the North and South almost no artillery was used, partly as a result of simple logistics (it is not easy to keep up the necessary supplies of shells and rockets when you’re advancing that rapidly, when priorities are sustaining the combat troops in the first place), but also in part because of other reasons that cannot be ignored, either.

“The absence of cannonades in the those campaigns, however, had more to do with ends than means. In the North, Russian reluctance to conduct bombardments stemmed from a desire to avoid antagonizing the local people, nearly all of whom, for reasons of language and ethnicity, tended to support the Ukrainian state. In the South, the Russian policy of avoiding the use of field artillery served the similarly political purpose of preserving the lives and property of communities in which many people identified as ‘Russian’ and many more spoke Russian as their native language.

In the East, however, the Russians conducted bombardments that, in terms of both duration and intensity, rivaled those of the great artillery contests of the world wars of the twentieth century.”

This bombardment in the East, he wrote, was made possible by short, secure and extremely redundant supply lines, to serve 3 purposes: 1, keep Ukrainian soldiers in their fortifications, 2, inflict large numbers of casualties, both physical or psychological, and 3, after such bombardments for sufficient periods of time, to force withdrawal or surrender by the battered defenders.

Marinus goes on to explain the concept of the ‘cauldron’, to encircle enemy positions, and then obliterate them from all sides. But where armies, following the German model, tend to exploit such cauldrons as quickly as possible, the Russians would either follow that, or be very slow and deliberate in their inevitable squeezing of such cauldrons. Because the Russians use both systems, they don’t feel any pressure to conquer or hold any piece of territory. He explained:
“Thus, when faced with a determined Ukrainian attack, the Russians often withdrew their tank and infantry units from the contested terrain. In this way, they both reduced danger to their own troops and created situations, however brief, in which the Ukrainian attackers faced Russian shells and rockets without the benefit of shelter.”

Marinus made an excellent comparison with World War I, when the Germans in 1917 would lure French troops to advance down recently captured ridges to exploit that gain. This would expose those troops on open field, in full range of artillery and machinegun fire.

“The effect of this experience on French morale was such that infantrymen in fifty French divisions engaged in acts of ‘collective indiscipline’, the motto for which was ‘We will hold, but we refuse to attack”. (In May of 2022, several videos appeared on the internet in which people claiming to be Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the Donbass region explained that, while they were willing to defend their positions, they had resolved to disobey any orders that called for them to advance.)”

In conclusion, Marinus explained the paradox between the modern tactics of rapid advances used in the North and South, versus the ‘old’ tactic of cannonades in the East. He posited that the raids in the first five weeks were a ‘grand deception’ that helped set up the right conditions in the East for this war of attrition.

In an important bit of insight, he wrote that this stark contrast between very different types of warfare, as waged by the Russian military in the different part of Ukraine, supported and reinforced what Russian information channels had been telling all along: “From the start, Russian propaganda insisted that the “special military operation” in Ukraine served three purposes: the protection of the two pro-Russian  protostates, “demilitarization,” and “denazification”. All three of these goals required the infliction of heavy losses upon Ukrainian formations fighting in the Donbass. None, however, depended upon the occupation of parts of Ukraine where the vast majority of people spoke the Ukrainian language, embraced a Ukrainian identity, and supported the Ukrainian state.”

The actions in the South served the political purpose of incorporating the mostly Russian speaking population into the “Russian world”, and the rapid expansion towards Mykolaiv and Odessa, after the rapid absorption of cities such as Kherson, Melitopol and Mariupol, helped make the deception of the actions in the North all the more believable and powerful.

After briefly discussing the use of guided missiles by the Russians, which scrupulously and very carefully avoided collateral damage, while being very judicious in their choice of targets, he noted that “Russia’s enemies found it hard to characterize strikes against fuel and ammunition depots, which were necessarily located at some distance from places where civilians lived and worked, as anything other than attacks on military installations.” Which explains why Ukrainian forces have tried to place such depots in populations centers, and when they are hit, as well, try to blame the Russians of attacking civilians as a war crime. Look, for example, at the attack on a depot in Kremenchuk. Debris had hit a nearby mall that had been closed (look at the lack of any parked cars in front of it!), but this was presented by Ukrainian propaganda as proof of Russians missiles targeting innocent civilians. As they tried the hide the fact that their own military was militarizing civilian centers, exposing them to the effects on the fully legitimate attacks on those military installations.

As a quick side note, I need to point a big difference with the way American forces have waged the last few wars. Where the Russians have gone through great lengths to avoid collateral damage, and avoiding mixed use installations, whenever the US military went into war, the first phase was always the destruction of the infrastructure of the targeted region or country. Electricity, communication, roads, railroads, as well as transportation, storage and distribution facilities, apart from the military targets, would always be included. Look, for example, at what the Deputy Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, General Samuel Clinton-Hinout said in regards to a potential war with China: the first targets in the event of an actual shooting war with China, would see the US forces initially target the logistical structure of China: roads, railroads, power, transport and storage hubs, etc. In Ukraine, the Russians have avoided railroads themselves,  or communication as well as electricity and other utility plants (on the contrary, they kept open the power lines from the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant to the rest of Ukraine, until very recently, as a result of the constant shelling of that power plant by the Ukrainians, more about that later in this article). Not saying that this means the Russians are doing better than the Americans, but I am saying that this level of restraint demonstrates exactly what the difference might be between the so-called Russian ‘Special Military Operation’ and an actual ‘war’.

This strictly military focus in the targeting by the Russians, is supported by that infamous report by Amnesty International, with a  title that cannot be  misunderstood: “Ukraine: Ukrainian fighting tactics endanger civilians”. From the report:

“Ukrainian forces have put civilians in harm’s way by establishing bases and operating weapons systems in populated residential areas, including in schools and hospitals, as they repelled the Russian invasion that began in February, Amnesty International said today. 

Such tactics violate international humanitarian law and endanger civilians, as they turn civilian objects into military targets. The ensuing Russian strikes in populated areas have killed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure. 

“We have documented a pattern of Ukrainian forces putting civilians at risk and violating the laws of war when they operate in populated areas,” said Agnès Callamard, Amnesty International’s Secretary General. 

“Being in a defensive position does not exempt the Ukrainian military from respecting international humanitarian law.””

As could be expected, this ignited a storm of protests in the Western media, accusing Amnesty International of being stooges for Putin, spreading dangerous propaganda aimed at weakening Ukraine. The Amnesty Ukraine chief even resigned, as he believed the organization was spreading "Russian propaganda".

"I am resigning from Amnesty International in Ukraine," Oksana Pokalchuk said in a press release on her Facebook page on Friday night to Saturday, accusing the report, published on 4 August, of unwittingly serving "Russian propaganda".

Amnesty, however, stood by their conclusions as they tried to limited the damage by those accusations: "Although we do not reject the conclusions of the report, we regret the pain caused by the report."

Back to Marinus, for his conclusion. Apart from his warning about a Russian Military that is, given what it showed in Ukraine, “liberated from both the brutality inherent in the legacy of Lenin and the blinders imposed by Marxism”. But he also added: “What would be even worse, we may find ourselves fighting disciples of John R. Boyd.” Boyd was a very influential military tactician in the 20th century, impacting heavily the way the US thinks about warfare, introducing concepts such as the OODA loop, etc. More interestingly, Marinus proved that the Russians more than likely already ARE such disciples, in what he wrote immediately before that ending warning. This is also a very important assessment, that goes straight against the narrative the Western Media has tried to construct, vilifying Russia.
“The three ground campaigns conducted by the Russians in Ukraine in 2022 owed much to traditional models. At the same time, the program of missile strikes exploited a capability that was nothing short of revolutionary. Whether new or old, however, these component efforts were conducted in a way that demonstrated profound appreciation of all three reals on which wars are waged. That is, the Russians rarely forget that, in addition to being a physical struggle, war is both a mental contest and a moral argument.”

Talking about the moral argument, something that has almost completely escaped the attention of the media in the West, is that Ukraine has made it a crime of treason, as collaboration with the enemy, to distribute, accept or be in possession of Russian humanitarian aid.

This is completely in breach of the Convention of Geneva and international law.

The International Red Cross wrote about this in context of war in Kosovo in 1999, and concluded that “the withholding of relief can constitute any of the three crimes considered [war crimes, crime of genocide or crimes against humanity], provided that their specific requirements are fulfilled.”

This is a concern in the next part we will discuss, the Ukrainian counter-offensive. We saw from the images in Bucha that civilians in possession of Russian food rations that were handed out to the civilians in the occupied town had been shot dead, after having been rounded up, and having their hands tied behind their backs (often with the neutral or pro-Russian white armbands). It is not a stretch to fear that civilians in the areas where the Russians are retreating will be subjected to similar reprisals, especially since that same policy that was informally applied in Bucha, has now been codified by national law!

Another concern that talks about the war being waged as a moral argument, requires to cover elements such as the use of ‘petal mines’, small explosives that maim their targets (or kill them, if they are small, like children): those have been dropped in large numbers above civilian areas in Donetsk and other places. The petal mines used are plastic, and very hard to detect with normal tools.

Or the constant shelling of the large nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency, after an inspection at that power plant, wrote in their report that the shelling needs to stop.

"Recommendation 1: The IAEA recommends an immediate cessation of shelling at and around the site to avoid any further damage to the plant and its associated facilities, for the safety of operating personnel and to maintain physical integrity to ensure safe operation. This requires the agreement of all relevant parties to establish a nuclear safety zone around the ZNPP".

Strangely, any reference as to WHO is doing the shelling, is completely absent. It calls upon the Russians to withdraw from the site, including their own nuclear experts from Rosatom, as well as their military, in hand over the plant to Ukrainian control and oversight, establishing a ‘nuclear safety zone’ around the nuclear power plant.

Vasily Nebenzya, the Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations, was very blunt about the IAEA report on the Zaporizhzhya NPP at the UN: "You could see with your own eyes that the plant is operating normally, and there are no internal threats to its safety. You had a great opportunity to make sure that the only threat is shelling and sabotage by the armed forces of Ukraine. We see confirmation of this in your conclusion that the physical safety of the station and its integrity, the risks for which have increased due to shelling, are of the greatest concern. We regret that in your report the source of the shelling is not directly indicated. We understand your position as the head of the international regulator, but in the current situation it is extremely important to call a spade a spade."

As an aside, a report from BioClandestine:
Also, keep in mind, the IAEA are currently investigating Iran’s Nuclear production and the information surrounding Obama’s 2015 Iran Deal.

I have no evidence to suggest they are connected, but I do find it odd that the IAEA are investigating situations in Deep State proxies Ukraine and Iran, at the same time.

The IAEA have come out of nowhere, and are currently looking where the metaphorical “bodies are buried”.

You can read his full article here.

And lastly, the following (on top of other crimes that I have chronicled in several of my previous articles):

It is clear to me that the Ukrainian side is actively and openly skirting or flat out violating international law and human rights. They and their media apparatus, aided by the Western media, are loudly accusing Russia of doing that, while refusing any responsibility of their own, countering any credible report as ‘Russian subterfuge’, such as the Amnesty International report. Smells like projecting, if you ask me. Accuse the others of what you are doing wrong, very loudly, to distract from your own wrongdoings. Whether or not the other side is guilty, is irrelevant (if they are not, pass of any proof of your own crimes as those of the others!).

(Oh, and as an aside, the Media is right, of course, when they state there are no neo-Nazis in Ukraine. Even not when the French media are filming footage of a patriotic young boy, dressed in camo fatigues and a plastic or wooden AK slung over his shoulder, greeting the passing Ukrainian vehicles with a military salute as the convoy passes through his town. They did not realize that the background shows another two young children, offering another type of salute…)

Back to the military assessment.

Some reports put the total number of shells fired by the US military in Iraq during the first Gulf War at 60,000. This is the number that Russia fires in a SINGLE day during this war, on all the various fronts.

A post on Telegram detailed an analysis by Scott Ritter, retired US Marine Corps officer, cited the following:

“According to ex-US marine corp officer Scott Ritter, the British would run out of ammunition in 2 weeks in a war against Russia. Scott Ritter said they would “not even last 2 weeks because they’d lose their entire army by then.”

According to Scott, NATO has been demilitarized. Even the United States, according to Scott, has run out of rounds for their most important systems which are meant to break down the russian military — in event of conflict.

Scott says that the Russian military, according to leaked documents by Ukrainian ministry of defense itself — inflicted 250,000 casualties onto the Ukrainians. This is 3x the size of Britain’s entire standing army.”

And:

“Scott Ritter estimates 15,000 combined casualties for Russia and its allies, this is in line with our previous estimation.

Ukrainians are losing thousands of men without ever seeing a Russian soldier face to face. This is in line with the videos we saw from various Ukrainian units who refused to fight and called on the Ukrainian authorities to pull them out of battle. They said the exact same thing. The casualty ratio between Russia and Ukraine is simply jaw dropping. These are numbers we have not seen in modern history.”

And:

“One more thing to add: while looking at maps, we only see “small advance” arrows. Small advance arrows accomplish one thing, they demilitarize Ukraine and inflict heavy casualties on the Ukrainians without putting Russian lives at danger. Russia is not on a timed schedule here. They have no reason to rush. Anyone who studied history, especially WW2 battles — is aware that big arrow map moves cost big casualties. Thousands of men die. There’s simply no reason for this. In fact, the longer Russia drags this out, the more they demilitarize Europe and drain the United States military supplies and funds.

At the same time, the Russian military is now the most combat experienced military in the world. The longer this drags on, the more soldiers get combat experience due to rotations. The more pilots get to perfect their skills, navy, intelligence, etc.”

This is interesting on several fronts. First, the issue of production capacity. Russia’s economy is under heavy embargoes, and is still a peacetime economy. Yet they are able to sustain months of such very high intensity bombardments, by artillery fire, rocket fire, and guided missiles. We keep hearing predictions that the Russians will run out of shells, rockets or missiles, and yet they keep up their attacks, unaltered. On the contrary, we start to hear how the Western stockpiles of weapons AND ammunitions are becoming depleted!

Next, the part on the casualties is in line with what we read by Marinus: this is the goal of the Russian army, the inflicting of heavy losses upon the Ukrainian army. It seems to be working, from what these numbers tell.

And lastly, the part on the advance arrows: this confirms what we saw in the war so far: at the beginning of the war, we heard constant reports, exaggerated or not, or simply overly highlighted, by the Western and Ukrainian media, about high Russian casualties and losses in troops and vehicles. This was due to the strategy chosen in the Northern and Southern areas of action: quick advances, over large territories. The “big arrow map moves”. Costly, too. Numbers from World War 2 cite a cost of 150,000 casualties in the first few weeks of the German Blitzkrieg (well, that was the total duration of that attack, over within a mere 6 weeks, capturing  the Netherlands, Belgium and France), with about 30,000 KIA against 90,000 French KIA. It is effective, but costly.

Those numbers cited by Scott Ritter and others are not just found on neutral or pro-Russian channels.
Ukrainian channels were discussing a number of leaked documents, purportedly from the Ukrainian General Staff:

From this the following can be learned (indeed as translated and found from a Russian poster, so I cannot independently confirm this. As such, I present this with a certain level of uncertainty):

- The AFU are only 43-48% complete;
- medical workers at the limit of their strength: the seriously wounded are transported to Europe;
- small arms and bulletproof vests are not enough;
- about 191 thousand soldiers were killed and wounded;
- there is not enough hydraulics and liquid nitrogen for M777 howitzers;
- no one cares about the missing - there are no statistics;
- the equipment transferred by the West is running out;
- Western weapons are operated by amateurs, since there are no qualified specialists;
- there is no way to repair weapons on the spot due to the lack of spare parts and specialists - everything is sent to Poland;
– the moral and psychological state of the Ukrainian military is practically at zero: even campaigns of encouragement in social networks and concerts do not help.

The last week or 10 days, the Ukrainians have staged a counter-offensive. Aimed at the front in the South, centered around Kherson, and in the North, just above and the East of Kharkov. Tens of thousands of troops are involved, together with hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, as well as planes and drones.

The media is hailing this as a huge success, and the beginning of the end for the Russians. But what is really going on?
Two things can be noted at first glance. The attacks in the South are a complete failure, in large part due to geography: terrain is much more flat, and open, providing precious little cover for amassing or attacking troops, leaving them open to obliterating artillery strikes. In a single area they managed to break through, but only a village wide, and about 3 villages deep, leaving them very vulnerable and exposed. In this case, I think the argument by some pro-Russian sources that this was deliberate, to lure them into a ‘cauldron’, might be plausible. This deep but narrow advance, in only a single location (Andreevka), is strange for the Russians (why only lose ground in this very small area, and why leaving it open for the Ukrainians to push through that deep?), as for the Ukrainians (why enter into such a killing zone that cannot reasonably be defended properly?). The Ukrainian offensive went nowhere, and the frontline is stable, with indications of Russians preparing their own counteroffensive. (Or are amassing their own forces in light of new concentrations by Ukrainian forces at certain places at the Southern front.)

Second, the attacks in the North around Kharkov, are a success, in that they managed to regain territory. This attack that started earlier this week, seems to have taken the Russians by surprise, and forced them to even withdraw from the strategically important Izyum to a more defensible position. This withdrawal is NOT planned, as part of some ‘masterplan’, but was necessitated by the sudden presence and force of the Ukrainian army. This front is still in flux, and the Ukrainians haven’t fully secured their gains yet, while Russia seems to be calling in large reinforcements. This needs to be watched as it develops.

In both cases, the offensives came at a very high cost, as attested by reports, including from French TV reports, of massive convoys of ambulances and lack of space in local hospitals as the wounded keep coming in.

In analysis, some interesting few points that are of note.

In 2017, a US Army captain, Nicholas J. Fiore, wrote a paper, Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group, based on what they had learned about the Russian army since 2014. The different Russian groups showed bad battlefield awareness, and lacked proper communication with other groups. Fiore pointed out that such could be exploited effectively by proper and bold maneuvering warfare.

As one commenter pointed out, “Maneuver warfare against superior firepower with acute situational awareness is highly fatal. The losses reported are about what you'd expect if assumptions regarding BTG capabilities were wrong.” In the Kherson offensive, the Russians were very much aware of what was going on, leading to a complete halting and eliminating of the Ukrainian forces, with very heavy casualties. To call this a ‘feint’ by the Ukrainians in preparation for the later started offensive near Kharkiv, would take way too light the enormous cost of lives and equipment they suffered near Kherson.

In the Kharkiv offensive, the Russians were taken by surprise. No awareness of the amassing of Ukrainian forces, until they started attacking. Overall, it seems that the Russians have upgraded their own organization and communication, improving the weak spots that Fiore had identified. The fact that they got taken by surprise, and under the cover of the terrain have failed to spot the incoming attack, and the resulting loss of territory, is reminiscent of the Battle of the Bulge. That initial German success proved nothing about the level of overall preparedness of the Allied forces, nor about the direction of the war at that point (which was already lost), and similarly, this looks like a desperation effort, given the reported amounts of casualties on Ukrainian side. A pyrrhic victory.

Another point to keep in mind, is that the Russians came in with a rather small military force, 150,000 Russian troops estimated as having amassed at the Ukrainian border, with another 40,000 or so troops from units from the Donbass regions Donetsk and Luhansk, about 1/3rd compared to the total numbers of the Ukrainian army. Based on an article from the very beginning of the war, The Ukrainian army had about 250,000 service members as of 2021, of which about 200,000 actual soldiers and not supporting personnel (excluding 53,000 border guards, 60,000 National Guard, at least 30,000 of the Security Service SBU, etc.), as well as volunteer territorial defense units and around 900,000 reservists. Ukraine has also called for conscription, to add to their military ranks.

After the end of the first stage (as described by Marinus in 3 distinct areas), the Northern area was largely abandoned, having reached their initial goals, to reinforce the areas in the East and South. Those transitioned to a much more cautious approach, similar to what the Eastern area did from the start, and opted for an artillery based, slow approach.

On a smaller scale, they responded to local Ukrainian counters either with overwhelming fire superiority to stop the attack, or they would fold back to allow the incoming enemy troops to take the terrain, then to encircle them and obliterate them while they were out in the open and on the move. Most of the time this involved very small areas and points of little to no strategic importance.

What is going on East and North of Kharkov, on the contrary, is in part very different, and an actual retreat to save their troops from possible flanking and encirclement by the sudden massive Ukrainian assault. The gain by the Ukrainian forces will be spinned as a PR victory, and the losses of the Russian forces if they did not retreat will be spinned as a PR victory, so regardless of the choice made, the PR machine would attempt to turn it into a victory. Still, a Russian retreat is much easier to spin into a victory for the Ukrainians (and a victory it is, especially in light of comment by Russian officials they would never leave any of those settlements that are now back in Ukrainian hands).

As Andrew Korybko pointed out in his article ‘Constructive Critiques connected to Russia’s Tactical Pullback from Kharkov’, Ukraine has managed to safeguard and amass a respectable amount of heavy weapons, troops and supplies for such large scale offensives. Russia’s slow and careful approach seems to have backfired, unable to fully eliminate the incoming Western weapons and supplies, nor the supply lines themselves.

Kiev will certainly use these territorial gains to demand more and newer weaponry and support from the West, claiming that it has proven to be able to use it with proper and actual results, after having been on the defense and retreating since the beginning of the war (some very small scale and local victories notwithstanding).

Question is, can they sustain these offensives? Did this not open themselves up for a counter by Russia? IntelSlava (a pro-Russian channel) reported that the “Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Zaluzhny and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine warned the office of the President and Zelensky himself that an offensive in two strategic directions could have bad consequences.  Due to the large losses in manpower and equipment, there may be a huge shortage of heavy weapons and experienced units.”

Having to throw in more and more reserves to either continue the offensives or to take the place of the units that were decimated, means less reserves to contain any breakthrough in case the Russians would decide to get serious and stop the slow, methodological and ‘safe’ approach, switching to a more aggressive approach.

Such approach seems to have started. There are reports of massive convoys of military vehicles and tanks towards Ukraine, characterized by some civilian eyewitness as the largest they’ve seen so far.

This Sunday,  reports are made that “in addition to multiple major power outages there are major water stoppages, reported by Ukraine, In Kharkov, Kyiv, Kremenchug, Pavlograd, Poltava, Dnepropetrovsk & Sumy regions along with reports of many power stations & infrastructures being hit & on fire NOW!”

Others on pro-Russian channels remark things like this: “After the gains by Ukraine in Kharkov there seems to be a clear uptake in Russia's operations and attacks. Could this be an indication that soon Russia will be official declaring war on Ukraine and no long be calling it a "Special Operation"?”

And

“There are 15 thermal power plants in Ukraine right now. None of them were built after 1991, that is after gaining independence. The number of thermal power plants built in an independent Ukraine is 0. All existing thermal power plants were built between 50s and 80s

After 7 months of SMO, Russia has finally started taking out Ukraine's power grid. Each destroyed thermal power plant is an irretrievable loss for Ukraine, just like the loss of a refinery. They have a brilliant chance to a/b test the Kaczynsky-pilled non-industrial ecofascism for the rest of the world”

There does seem to be a change in direction by the Russians, that, if real, is only beginning. We will need to continue to monitor that, to see where all this is headed. If real, this might mean a more aggressive Russian approach, against which the demoralized, stretched and exhausted Ukrainian troops likely will have little resistance left. If only a temporary uptick, this might undermine the Russian negotiating position and endgame, allowing the Ukrainians to continue to build up their forces through the influx of NATO and western aid and weapons.

Meanwhile, the West seems to be doubling down, and the NYT writes ‘U.S. Plans New Shipment of Howitzers, Ammunition and Other Supplies to Ukraine’, while Zerohedge reports that the ‘German Foreign Minister Says Support For Ukraine Will Continue "No Matter What Voters Think"’. Despite the increasing protest and unrest, and the admitted impending collapse of their own economies, NATO and the EU (and US) are doubling down… All or nothing!

On a more serious and sad note, the following reports are also coming in, not surprisingly:

“Ukrainian troops are engaged in wide-spread looting and murder in the captured territories of Kharkov region: according to the sources on the ground, looting groups of Ukrainian militants broken into the basement, where a wealthy Roma family, owning a large restaurant in Izyum, was hiding from the shelling, and requested to hand over valuables at a gunpoint. When they declined, the head of the family was shot on the spot. 

Another reported case, apparently in Izyum, too, was an assault on the house of a local businessman. The Banderites blew the door, the owner was killed by the  explosion before he could even open the door.

Similar messages arrive from Kupyansk, where groups of Ukrainian militants go door-to-door, raiding private apartments and houses.”
(Telegram, War in Ukraine, Subtitled)

And:

“Cases of purges and repressions are commited by Ukrainian Security Service against the civilian population of Kharkov region - Lugansk People's Republic leader Leonid Pasechnik.”
(Telegram, Intel Republic)

And as a last bit of food for thought, this little gem that very succinctly summarized at least the broad outlines of what is going on:

“Ukraine and Russian Federation in their pre-2014 borders were unnatural entities created by a stroke of pen by some lunatics. The west has latched onto the largest stray piece that's fallen out of the larger puzzle and is using it as its military and political proxy. Russia is taking a stand which would define its future and the right to exist. Let God sort us out.”

To be continued…