Based on this reconstruction, it would still be correct to state that the Ukrainians "blew up" the dam, since it failed precisely where they had been shelling and where they had hit the sluice gate with a missile. They knew the dam was weakened there -- that it just needed a bit more stress -- which they then applied by increasing the discharge from upstream reservoirs that they controlled.
Semantically, I would argue against that statement of 'they blew it up'. The artillery attacks weakened it, as did aging. The main action that was aimed at directly affecting the integrity of the dam, causing some sort of flooding event, was the rising water by releasing upstream water. 'They blew it up' implies that the action of explosives are directly responsible, when they were not.
Colloquially, your statement is correct, but only indirectly, you are right. But I like precise language, now more than ever, in this age of fake news and propaganda. So yes, you 'could' say that, but I 'would not', as I want to go back to precision, especially when blame and responsibility for events like this dam breach are concerned. Which means I am not really arguing against you, but trying to make a wider point.
But I 100% agree with your assignment of responsibility: the Ukrainians knew what they were doing when they dumped water into the Kakhovka reservoir. They got a whole lot more than they bargained for, I suspect, as the level of destruction was just about as high as could happen. I am afraid, with the erosion of the earth dam between the power plant and the lock, the dam is leveled down to the bottom, meaning the reservoir will empty completely.
I hadn't seen that list yet, (it was published today, I notice), only very partial collections of some of those dates. Thank you for sending that, very helpful!
Most of the strikes were aimed at either the road and railroad itself, right past the power plant buildings (i included pictures of that), or at the lock area right past the control building of the power plant. I can imagine the power plant building itself was also targeted at times, as the Russians had military assets there guarding the dam, with machine guns, snipers and grenade launchers. There was generally, with some exceptions, a certain carefulness about what to hit, is my impression.
What is very interesting, is the report of 3 of the 6 turbines being damaged: those, if I were to bet, were in the central portion of the building of the power plant, weakening that central part even further, causing that collapse.
The reports talk about the dam (which is the earthen structure, I did point out shell holes in one of the first pictures, together with a dug in trench line). Such attacks are rather harmless, as even the larger caliber strikes would do just about no meaningful damage to the earthen structure, nor indirectly through the repeated impact and vibrations of each impact on the concrete structure.
It also talks about the HPP or the plant, which means the buildings at the left side, that collapsed later.
It does show, however, the immense risk they DID take of targeting such a sensitive structure so often, and with at times such heavy weaponry. It only confirms the further weakening of the concrete parts of the dam by the Ukrainians in the months leading up to the full collapse.
This is an important bit of work, Arn. I hope it’s seen and spread. I’ve yet to read the other pieces you so kindly linked, but will when I can.
I believe that this scenario is by far the most reasonable and factual. In fact, given the events and existing compromising structural conditions, it’s obvious. It’s a forehead slap (and a needed alert) to all of us so caught up in the war and intrigue that we rush to judgement. As usual, you’ve restored us to plumb.
Most pieces go rather deep in an evaluation of 'cui bono', who benefits the most? While that method is certainly important, and can lead to fascinating insight, it is not the end-all, especially in cases like this, where both parties can be assigned a certain level of benefit, and certain things can be explained either positively or negatively (Russian commander installs his defensive line several miles away from the Dnieper: did he know he was going to blow the dam, or did he anticipate the Ukrainians try some funny business? I've seen both sides argued, based on the exact same set of information....).
The nice thing about my analysis was that I did not have to spent a single word on any of that. The facts, when looked at calmly, and in a complete context, rather speak for themselves.
A question: is it possible that the release of all that water upriver, flowing into the reservoir & overburdening the dam could have been merely the necessary release of seasonal rise in water levels?
This is done here in Oregon & is a delicate balance, requiring (I would think) well-considered coordination between the other dam systems management, both up- and downstream — Something not easily done given the Kakhovka dam situation. Because of damage or danger, it was unable to release what in other years may have been a manageable volume of water. So, it very likely was not a conscious or intentional act on Ukraine’s part.
I’m inclined to think that’s the case — or perhaps the war itself impacted the dam system management personnel in the other upstream dams — who also HAD to release the volumes coming to them.
Very interesting and seems very well researched. Thanks!!!
God Bless!
God Wins!!!
Well reasoned article.
Based on this reconstruction, it would still be correct to state that the Ukrainians "blew up" the dam, since it failed precisely where they had been shelling and where they had hit the sluice gate with a missile. They knew the dam was weakened there -- that it just needed a bit more stress -- which they then applied by increasing the discharge from upstream reservoirs that they controlled.
Thanks for your work.
Semantically, I would argue against that statement of 'they blew it up'. The artillery attacks weakened it, as did aging. The main action that was aimed at directly affecting the integrity of the dam, causing some sort of flooding event, was the rising water by releasing upstream water. 'They blew it up' implies that the action of explosives are directly responsible, when they were not.
Colloquially, your statement is correct, but only indirectly, you are right. But I like precise language, now more than ever, in this age of fake news and propaganda. So yes, you 'could' say that, but I 'would not', as I want to go back to precision, especially when blame and responsibility for events like this dam breach are concerned. Which means I am not really arguing against you, but trying to make a wider point.
But I 100% agree with your assignment of responsibility: the Ukrainians knew what they were doing when they dumped water into the Kakhovka reservoir. They got a whole lot more than they bargained for, I suspect, as the level of destruction was just about as high as could happen. I am afraid, with the erosion of the earth dam between the power plant and the lock, the dam is leveled down to the bottom, meaning the reservoir will empty completely.
Thank you for your reply and engagement!
Here is a timeline of artillery strikes against the dam in 2022...
https://telegra.ph/Strikes-by-the-Armed-Forces-of-Ukraine-against-the-dam-of-the-Kakhovskaya-hydroelectric-power-plant-Chronology-06-10
I hadn't seen that list yet, (it was published today, I notice), only very partial collections of some of those dates. Thank you for sending that, very helpful!
Most of the strikes were aimed at either the road and railroad itself, right past the power plant buildings (i included pictures of that), or at the lock area right past the control building of the power plant. I can imagine the power plant building itself was also targeted at times, as the Russians had military assets there guarding the dam, with machine guns, snipers and grenade launchers. There was generally, with some exceptions, a certain carefulness about what to hit, is my impression.
What is very interesting, is the report of 3 of the 6 turbines being damaged: those, if I were to bet, were in the central portion of the building of the power plant, weakening that central part even further, causing that collapse.
The reports talk about the dam (which is the earthen structure, I did point out shell holes in one of the first pictures, together with a dug in trench line). Such attacks are rather harmless, as even the larger caliber strikes would do just about no meaningful damage to the earthen structure, nor indirectly through the repeated impact and vibrations of each impact on the concrete structure.
It also talks about the HPP or the plant, which means the buildings at the left side, that collapsed later.
It does show, however, the immense risk they DID take of targeting such a sensitive structure so often, and with at times such heavy weaponry. It only confirms the further weakening of the concrete parts of the dam by the Ukrainians in the months leading up to the full collapse.
—————
Wanted to note a typo, I believe, in the the paragraph beginning the section on water levels: “2020” should “2022” (? )
(If this has been mentioned here already, or if I’m mistaken, please ignore.)
——————
Reading with great interest. Excellent!
You are the first to mention it, and the last, as I just fixed what indeed was a typo, my apologies!
Thank you for taking the time to point that out, and for reading my work.
This is an important bit of work, Arn. I hope it’s seen and spread. I’ve yet to read the other pieces you so kindly linked, but will when I can.
I believe that this scenario is by far the most reasonable and factual. In fact, given the events and existing compromising structural conditions, it’s obvious. It’s a forehead slap (and a needed alert) to all of us so caught up in the war and intrigue that we rush to judgement. As usual, you’ve restored us to plumb.
Thank you much.
Much appreciated!
Most pieces go rather deep in an evaluation of 'cui bono', who benefits the most? While that method is certainly important, and can lead to fascinating insight, it is not the end-all, especially in cases like this, where both parties can be assigned a certain level of benefit, and certain things can be explained either positively or negatively (Russian commander installs his defensive line several miles away from the Dnieper: did he know he was going to blow the dam, or did he anticipate the Ukrainians try some funny business? I've seen both sides argued, based on the exact same set of information....).
The nice thing about my analysis was that I did not have to spent a single word on any of that. The facts, when looked at calmly, and in a complete context, rather speak for themselves.
Feel free to share everywhere you want/can.
A question: is it possible that the release of all that water upriver, flowing into the reservoir & overburdening the dam could have been merely the necessary release of seasonal rise in water levels?
This is done here in Oregon & is a delicate balance, requiring (I would think) well-considered coordination between the other dam systems management, both up- and downstream — Something not easily done given the Kakhovka dam situation. Because of damage or danger, it was unable to release what in other years may have been a manageable volume of water. So, it very likely was not a conscious or intentional act on Ukraine’s part.
I’m inclined to think that’s the case — or perhaps the war itself impacted the dam system management personnel in the other upstream dams — who also HAD to release the volumes coming to them.
Very good question! I will answer that in a follow-up article.