Not what you expected...
Very interesting and seems very well researched. Thanks!!!
Well reasoned article.
Based on this reconstruction, it would still be correct to state that the Ukrainians "blew up" the dam, since it failed precisely where they had been shelling and where they had hit the sluice gate with a missile. They knew the dam was weakened there -- that it just needed a bit more stress -- which they then applied by increasing the discharge from upstream reservoirs that they controlled.
Thanks for your work.
Wanted to note a typo, I believe, in the the paragraph beginning the section on water levels: “2020” should “2022” (? )
(If this has been mentioned here already, or if I’m mistaken, please ignore.)
Reading with great interest. Excellent!
A question: is it possible that the release of all that water upriver, flowing into the reservoir & overburdening the dam could have been merely the necessary release of seasonal rise in water levels?
This is done here in Oregon & is a delicate balance, requiring (I would think) well-considered coordination between the other dam systems management, both up- and downstream — Something not easily done given the Kakhovka dam situation. Because of damage or danger, it was unable to release what in other years may have been a manageable volume of water. So, it very likely was not a conscious or intentional act on Ukraine’s part.
I’m inclined to think that’s the case — or perhaps the war itself impacted the dam system management personnel in the other upstream dams — who also HAD to release the volumes coming to them.